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MARKET VOLATILITY: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES
Clord W. Smith, Jr. t
Recent studies have argued that stock market volatility is not
constant over time. For example, Schwert has estimated monthly
volatility from 1836 to 1987. Figure Itt displays his estimates.
Schwert measures volatility by calculating the standard deviation of
daily returns for each month for a portfolio of stocks. As Figure 1
illustrates, volatility is very high during the Great Depression-the
standard deviation is frequently above ten percent, compared to a
normal range of two to six percent. Volatility was also greater dur-
ing the 1857 and 1907 recessions and during the OPEC oil crisis.
Schwert concludes that these are predictable and persistent changes
in the level of volatility.
In this paper, I want to address two basic questions: (1) What
can be said about the causes of the volatility changes; and (2) Why
do we care how volatile these prices are?
I
CAUSES-THE LONG RUN
The first important question is whether volatility changes sim-
ply reflect changes in other markets. For example, is there a similar
pattern in exchange rate volatility, interest rate volatility, or com-
modity price volatility? While I do not have data that covers the
150-year period that Schwert collected, Figure 2 presents data from
1967 to 1987: Figure 2a shows the variability of the dollar relative
to foreign currencies (the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agree-
ment in the early 1970s stands out clearly in this data); Figure 2b
shows what has happened to interest rates; Figure 2c displays the
variability in iron and steel prices; and Figure 2d shows volatility in
t Clarey Professor of Finance, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Ad-
ministration, University of Rochester, New York. The research was partially supported
by theJohn M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Man-
agerial Economics Research Center at the Simon School. Research assistance was pro-
vided by Jonathan Glazer, John M. Olin Fellow at the Bradley Policy Research Center.
1 G. SCHWERT, WHY DOES STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY CHANGE OVER TIME? (Uni-
versity of Rochester Working Paper GPB 87-11, 1989).
ti All Figures are contained in an appendix to this paper.
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crude oil prices. 2 No statistically reliable association exists among
these series.
Another concern is the relation between macroeconomic vari-
ables and market volatility. Schwert has performed a careful statisti-
cal analysis of the relations between market volatility and a number
of macroeconomic variables. 3 He finds: (1) stock market volatility is
higher during recessions, especially during the Great Depression;
(2) weak evidence that macroeconomic volatility-as measured by
industrial production and business failures-can help predict stock
volatility; (3) stronger evidence that financial asset volatility helps
predict future security market volatility; and (4) financial leverage
affects stock market volatility.
The relation between volatility and leverage is not surprising.
If a firm has fifty percent debt in its capital structure and the value of
its assets goes up by one percent, the value of the equity will rise by
twice that as long as the riskiness of the debt has not changed. If the
increase in asset value reduces the risk of the debt and increases its
value, then the change in equity value from a change in the value of
the firm's assets will be reduced, but the general positive relation
will hold. Schwert finds that time series variation in financial lever-
age does increase stock market volatility, but that the explanatory
power provided by this variable is small.
Finally, there seems to be a relation between trading activity
and stock volatility. Such a relation is consistent with the proposi-
tion that sophisticated traders infer information from other traders'
actions.4
II
CAUSES-EVIDENCE FROM THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH
Studying data over a long period of time, as Schwert did, pro-
vides one way to understand volatility; looking at a shorter period in
much greater detail provides another. Because of its extreme vola-
tility, many researchers have focused on the October 1987 market
crash as a way to understand volatility from a complementary per-
spective. For instance, it has been widely suggested that the opera-
tion of the financial futures markets in Chicago increased volatility
in the stock market.5 The allegations usually focus on the role that
programmed trading, portfolio insurance and triple witching hours
2 Interestingly, oil price volatility has been relatively stable compared to fluctua-
tions in iron and steel prices.
3 G. SCHWERT, supra note 1.
4 See Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986).
5 This has been forcefully stated in the New York Stock Exchange report on the
October crash.
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had in contributing to the market crash. Figure 3 shows monthly
volatility from 1984 to 1988: the little spikes that periodically ap-
pear are triple witching hours-those times when the expiration of
futures contracts and options contracts coincide. No significant cor-
relation exists between triple witching hours and stock market
volatility.
Additionally, the relation between market volatility and changes
in futures trading volume must be considered. Figure 4 shows aver-
age trading volume on the S&P 500 index futures contract. Here,
volume is measured as just the number of longs or the number of
shorts-although in one sense the aggregate amount of trading is
always zero, for every long there must be a short. Statistical analysis
of the data in Figure 4 indicates that changes in volatility are not
associated with changes in futures trading volume.
Next, the relation between market volatility and the futures in-
dex must be examined. Blume, MacKinlay and Terker 6 have care-
fully documented what happened to prices in New York and
Chicago during the October 1987 crash. The S&P 500 fell twenty
percent on October 19th. However, not all stocks were being
traded that day. IBM, which represents eight percent of the S&P
index, did not open until 10:45 a.m. Only ninety percent of the
stocks were being traded as of 11:00 a.m. In addition, the tape was
running between 15 and thirty minutes late. Basically this meant
that anyone trading on the published S&P index was using outdated
information. The evidence suggests that the traders in Chicago
were not fooled by the misleading index-they appear to have made
their trades based on what they thought the index would have been
if quotes from New York were timely. Consequently, I believe the
futures index was a more accurate reflection of market conditions
than the reported S&P index.
Roll 7 has studied different markets around the world and docu-
mented substantial variation in the rules governing the various mar-
kets. By comparing what happened in London, Tokyo, Sydney,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Paris, and other world markets he has de-
termined how the presence or absence of certain rules affected each
market during the crash.8 Roll tried to analyze how the various in-
6 M. BLUME, A. MACKINLAY & B. TERKER, ORDER IMBALANCES AND STOCK PRICE
MOVEMENTS ON OCTOBER 19 AND 20 (University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, 1988).
7 Roll, The International Crash of October 1987, in BLACK MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS 35 (R. Kamphuis, R. Kormendi &J. Watson ed. 1989).
8 First, Roll notes that all major markets declined substantially during the month
of October. Of the 23 countries that he examined, 19 had declines of greater than
twenty percent. The United States had the fifth smallest decline when measured in local
currency units, but since the dollar also declined during this period its decline was elev-
enth smallest when restated to a common currency. Roll also determined that the
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stitutional market characteristics are related to the extent of the
market crash. Several of those are associated with larger price de-
clines-the existence of a continuous auction process and auto-
mated quotations. Others lessened the' impact of the crash-the
presence of specialists and the existence of computer-directed trad-
ing. Still others were statistically unrelated to the extent of the de-
cline-forward trading, options and futures trading, transactions
taxes, off-exchange trading, price limits, and margin requirements.
Roll finds no evidence to support the notion that program trading
and portfolio insurance adversely affected the United States market
during the crash.
III
CONSEQUENCES OF STOCK VOLATILITY
Let us now turn to the second question: Why do we care about
volatility? I think there are at least four reasons: (1) an expected
increase in volatility will increase the expected risk premium and
thereby affect a firm's cost of capital;9 (2) greater volatility in firm
value increases the compensating differential required to retain cor-
porate managers; 10 (3) the value of incentive compensation tools
like stock options is reduced as aggregate market volatility in-
creases;" and (4) what I consider to be the biggest problem, in-
creased volatility gives people in Washington an excuse to "fix" the
markets..
Politicians have faced a strong challenge to proposals for active
intervention in security markets over the past twenty years from the
proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis. The idea started
with Cowles 12 who noted the inability of professionals to forecast
stock price changes; and statisticians like Working, 13 Kendall14 and
Osborne' 5 who suggested that stock prices and commodity prices
United States market was not the first to decline: non-Japanese Asian markets began the
decline, followed by European markets, then North American markets, and finally Japa-
nese markets.
9 French, Schwert & Stambaugh, Expected Stock Returns and Volatility, 19 J. FIN.
ECON. 3 (1987).
10 Smith & Stulz, The Determinants of Firm's Hedging Policies, 20j. FIN. QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 391 (1985).
11 Smith & Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of U.S. Executive Compensation Plans, 7 Aus-
TRALIANJ. MGMT. 139 (1982).
12 Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, I ECONOMETRiCA 309 (1933).
13 Working, A Random Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time Series, 29 J. AM.
STAT. Assoc. 11 (1934).
14 Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time Series, Part 1: Prices, 96J. ROYAL STAT. SOC.
11-25 (1953).
15 Osborne, Periodic Structure in the Brownian Motion of Stock Prices, 10 OPERATIONS
RESEARCH 345 (1962); Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS RE-
SEARCH 145 (1959).
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behave like a random walk-that is, stock price changes behave as if
they were independent random drawings. This was followed by
Samuelson1 6 and Mandelbrot17 who provide the modem theoretical
rationale for the efficient markets hypothesis. They argue that in a
competitive securities market, price changes must reflect new infor-
mation. Since, by definition, new information cannot be deduced
from previous information, new information must be independent
over time. This hypothesis is probably the most extensively tested
proposition in the social sciences, and the evidence is amazingly
consistent with its predictions.1 8
Yet the October 1987 crash caused many to argue that the effi-
cient markets hypothesis must be incorrect. I believe that this argu-
ment represents flawed logic for at least three reasons: (1) The
efficient markets hypothesis does not imply that volatility is con-
stant. While the academic community has yet to provide a convinc-
ing explanation of the causes of the October crash, that should not
be evidence against the efficient markets hypothesis. Logically, ig-
norance in the academic community cannot be evidence either for
or against a particular hypothesis. What has been requested in this
case differs fundamentally from what the academic community has
heretofore supplied. Typically, in testing the efficient markets hy-
pothesis, academics have examined an event which should be associ-
ated with a change in cash flows or risk and documented a
concomitant stock price change. Here, academics are being asked
to look at a stock price change and explain what caused it. Collec-
tively, we have little experience in answering this question. (2) A
large stock price change does not require a single large piece of in-
formation. If underlying events are correlated, then relatively small
current events can produce large stock price reactions. (3) In cer-
tain cases, it is questionable to focus on abnormally large observa-
tions. For example, if I have a theory that explains the observations
around the mean but does not explain extreme outliers, it can still
be a useful model. At the bottom line, it takes a theory to beat a
theory.
IV
PROPOSALS TO "Fix" THE SECURITY MARKETS
Finally, I would like to talk about some of the proposals to "fix"
16 Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT
REV. 41-49 (1965).
17 Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models, 39 J.
Bus. 242 (1966).
18 See E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE (1976) for a review of much of the
evidence.
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the security markets. One proposal is to create a single agency with
regulatory authority over all interrelated financial markets to facili-
tate market coordination. However, I believe that this is a proposal
to create a governmental regulatory monopoly. Now, if someone
proposed granting IBM a monopoly in computers, the outrage
would be widespread. Yet if a monopoly is bad in the private sector
why is it a good thing in the public sector? Proponents argue that a
single agency would facilitate the coordination of markets. How-
ever, in the mid-1970s, the SEC regulated both options trading and
stock trading on the Philadelphia exchange. Because of their con-
cern about market manipulation, they required that a wall be built
on the trading floor to separate the option and stock trading. I do
not see how the creation of one master agency will get regulators to
focus on coordinating markets at all.
This proposal also assumes that regulatory agencies have the
ability to recognize ill-functioning markets and to implement correc-
tive policies on a timely basis. The Federal Reserve has argued that
it employs its authority to set margin requirements to stop "unwar-
ranted speculation" when there is an upswing in the market. When
the market returns to normal, the Fed generally claims that its ac-
tions were successful in correcting the problem. But basic financial
theory tells us that abnormal returns will be bid away regardless of
any restraints imposed on the market. Schwert 19 examines the effect
on market volatility of the Fed's changes in margin requirements
and finds that increases in the margin requirement are associated
with prior increases in volatility, but that increases in margin have
no predictive ability with respect to future changes in volatility.
Therefore the evidence suggests the Fed can accurately look back
and document what has happened, but they have no apparent ability
to affect future volatility. Such evidence makes me question any
other government agency's ability to do better.
The second proposal is the establishment of "circuit breakers"
in the market. Some argue that since prior limits already exist in the
futures markets, this would merely be taking a good idea from one
market and applying it in a new area. However, I believe that we
must be very careful to distinguish between price limits voluntarily
adopted by an exchange and those externally imposed by a regula-
tory agency. The NYSE has strong incentives to choose a set of op-
erating rules which maximize its value. Thus I must conclude that if
there were a way to increase the attractiveness of the exchange to
traders by imposing price limits they would already have been im-
19 G. SCHWERT, supra note 1.
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plemented; if it did not, it would risk losing trades to competing
exchanges offering more efficient rules.
Brennan 20 arguies that price limits in futures markets serve as a
partial substitute for posting margins. To understand his argument,
consider the Brazilian coffee freeze of a few years ago and its impact
on futures markets. Traders became aware of the freeze in their
morning papers and knew that spot and futures prices were going to
go up. On the first day of trading, prices rose until the price limit
was reached. If I had written coffee futures I might have owed
$2000 for the day. On the second day the same thing happened:
the price limit was reached and I would owe another $2000. The
same thing might happen on the third and fourth days until the new
market-clearing price was reached, so that overall I would have
owed $8000. Now if I knew in advance that I was going to lose
$8000, I might simply default on the transaction on the first day.
But price limits restrict the information about equilibrium coffee
prices, thus I do not know what the final market-clearing price is to
be. Therefore, Brennan argues, I would be less likely to default on
the contract. Brennan's argument implies that this mechanism will
not work in markets where investors can calculate forward prices
and determine for themselves the new equilibrium price. Thus,
price limits are not typically applied to interest rate futures, where
future prices can be inferred from bond prices. If Brennan's expla-
nation for the use of price limits is correct, then imposing them on
stock markets will simply reduce the liquidity of the market. And
even though the limits might be set so that they are imposed infre-
quently, they have their greatest impact at precisely those times
when participants want to trade the most.
In sum, given our current state of knowledge of the causes of
stock market volatility, I believe that the case for active intervention
in the marketplace is weak. In my opinion, most of the proposed
changes in the operation of the market have the potential to do as
much harm as good. Given the competition we face in world capital
markets, I would hope that we do not regulatorily saddle United
States markets with an onerous regulatory burden simply to provide
the appearance of doing something.
20 Brennan, A Theory of Price Limits in Futures Markets, 16J. FIN. EcON. 213 (1986).
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APPENDIX
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Fig. 1: Standard deviations of monthly stock returns, 1836-1987 from Schwert 1988.
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Fig. 2a
Variability of 90 day US treasury bill yield
(Vertical axis: Proportionate scale)
Fig. 2b
Variability of weighted-average value of
US $ in terms of foreign currencies
(Vertical axis: Proportionate scale)
Fig. 2c
Variability ol iron and steel prices
(Vertical axis: Proportionate scale)
Fig. 2d
Variability of crude petroleum price
(Vertical axis: Proportionate scale)
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Fig. 3: Estimates of monthly S&P volatility based on last 20 daily returns from 1984 through 1987
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Fig 4: Average daily trading volume on S&P 500 Index futures contracts(in thousands)
